The Brazilian Miracle and Its Limits by Kingstone, Peter
Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 18 | Number 4 Article 4
2012
The Brazilian Miracle and Its Limits
Peter Kingstone
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law and
Business Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation







Paper prepared for presentation at the Conference
on BRICs, Tower Center, SMU
I. INTRODUCTIONBRAZIL has enjoyed a high status among developing countries
through much of the twentieth century. Its large size and popula-
tion, coupled with abundant natural resources, made it a "sleeping
giant" that had dwarfed even its colonizer, Portugal, well before indepen-
dence arrived in the early nineteenth century. But for most of its history,
the "sleeping giant" did not awaken-as Brazilians jokingly observed,
"Brazil is the country of the future, and always will be." Even its miracle
years of 1967-1974 proved short-lived, culminating in a much longer pe-
riod of debt, inflation, and declining wealth and welfare.
As of 2012, Brazil appears once again to be enjoying its status as a
leading developing economy, this time as a member of the "BRIC" group
of emerging markets poised to challenge the position and influence of the
developed economies. Yet, the country's long history of failing to live up
to its promises raises the question of whether this period is any different
than other episodes of rapid growth in the past. This paper explores the
issue over three sections. In the first section, the paper makes the case
that this current period does indeed offer evidence of performance wor-
thy of celebration. In the second section, the paper reviews some of the
areas of strong performance and establishes that there are grounds to
believe that something durable and sustainable might be happening in
Brazilian politics and the economy. In particular, the argument centers
on the consensual support for a "pragmatic neoliberal" orientation to ec-
onomic policy that combines elements of both market and state-led mod-
els of development. In the third section, the paper considers some of the
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deep challenges that continue to face Brazil and limit the possibility of
meaningful and sustainable development progress. The conclusion re-
views the evidence and warns that Brazil has made important strides on
the backs of good policy and sound economic management. Neverthe-
less, there are real risks of falling into a commodity trap and losing out in
the longer term to other emerging markets, particularly China.
II. A BRAZILIAN MIRACLE?
Brazil's development progress, particularly over the 2000s, has granted
it a starring role among emerging markets, one of the so-called "BRIC"
countries. As of 2012, Brazil's economic performance led it to surpass
the United Kingdom as the sixth largest economy in the world, and its
greatly improved international stature manifested itself in a variety of
ways, including successful bids to host both the 2014 World Cup and the
2016 Summer Olympics. This newfound stature comes as something of a
surprise for long standing observers of the Brazilian political economy.
From the 1980s into the early 2000s, a wide array of analysts focused on
what were believed to be critical impediments to overcoming deeply
rooted economic, political, and social problems. Brazil's political institu-
tions, in particular, made the country "ungovernable," suffering from
what Barry Ames called a "deadlock" and Bolivar Lamounier referred to
as "hyperactive paralysis."'
These institutional dysfunctions suggested that policymakers would not
be able to get policy solutions to long-standing problems through the cha-
otic legislative environment. Those problems included enormous chal-
lenges like bringing down high levels of poverty and inequality; reforming
financially unsustainable social policies that did little for the mass of
Brazilians; promoting adjustments among uncompetitive producers, de-
pendent on decades-old protection and incapable of integrating into a
globalizing economy; improving inadequate infrastructure, suffering from
years of neglect; cleaning up severely disordered public finances; and per-
haps most notably, taming the high persistent inflation that had been the
scourge of the country since the 1940s. In short, the set of challenges
facing Brazilian policymakers was formidable and appeared to over-
whelm the political mechanisms for advancing and implementing
solutions.2
1. Barry Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2001; Bolivar Lamounier, "Brazil: The Hyperactive Paralysis Syn-
drome" in Constructing Democratic Governance: Latin America and the Carib-
bean in the 1990's, edited by Jorge J. Dominguez and Abraham F. Lowenthal.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
2. The issue of Brazil's political institutions has provoked one of the richest and most
productive debates in the politics of the developing world. Early works critiquing
the country's institutions, many published by U.S.-based scholars, led to a re-
sponse, largely by Brazilian scholars, arguing that the system was largely func-
tional. This latter wave of scholarship has made considerable advances in
identifying and elaborating a far more detailed and in-depth portrait of the func-
tioning of Brazil's institutions. For a review of the rise of this alternative view,
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Through most of the period since 1985, the year democracy returned to
Brazil after twenty-one years of military rule, the country's performance
matched the low expectations. Economic growth was erratic at best. In-
flation remained at crippling levels and provoked repeated and often ex-
treme measures to contain it. Poverty, inequality, and unemployment all
remained high. Debt, both external and internal, and persistent govern-
ment deficits complicated struggles to bring order to the macro-economy.
Politically, the period from 1985 to 1994 witnessed a new constitution,
derided and declared a failure almost immediately; at least two com-
pletely ineffective presidents, and a third impeached after nearly three
years; marked by continuous fighting with the legislature; and a massive
scandal that led to a rash of congressional resignations. As of the early
1990s, The Economist's labeling of Brazil as "drunk" or Scott Mainwar-
ing's accusation of "feckless democracy" seemed perfectly apt.3
Eighteen years later, the picture has changed dramatically. Space con-
siderations do not permit a full examination of how Brazil has altered its
path. But the extent of the change does invite some effort to substantiate
the enthusiasm with which much of the world sees Brazil today-a new
"Brazilian miracle."4 There are least three different indicators that can
be used to demonstrate the degree of Brazil's success: international stat-
ure, economic data, and the quality of policy.
International Stature: One of the clearest, albeit subjective, indicators
of Brazil's progress is the country's new status in the world. Winning the
bids for the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics, both to be
held in Rio de Janeiro, point to the perception that Brazil is a leader in
the global South. But Brazil's status also finds expression in its leader-
ship position in the effort to expand the G-8 to the G-20, as well as its
role in several new organizations challenging the architecture of the
global political economy. As a "BRIC" country, Brazil has met with its
counterparts to develop common positions on key issues of international
political economy. It has also moved on a new organizational initiative
with India and South Africa, IBSA, as well as a new South American
organization, UNASUR. Moreover, Brazil's strengthened performance
often referred to as "coalitional presidentialism," see Timothy Power, "Optimism,
Pessimism, and Coalitional Presidentialism: Debating the Institutional Design of
Brazilian Democracy." Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2010:
pp. 18-33.
3. The Economist, "Drunk Not Sick: Brazil, the Blessed and the Cursed (Survey of
Brazil)," December 7 (1991), p. SI; Scott Mainwaring, "Brazil: Weak Parties, Feck-
less Democracy," in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy J. Scully, eds., Building Demo-
cratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1995.
4. The 'Brazilian Miracle' typically refers to the period 1967-1974 when rapid growth
and industrial deepening made Brazil one of the best performing economies in the
world. Unfortunately, the real progress was overstated, the real obstacles under-
stated, and ultimately the havoc that began with the 1973 oil shock led to the dis-
appointments of the "lost decade" of the 1980s. For what turned out to be a
prescient skepticism about the 'miracle' see Albert Fishlow, "Some Reflections on
Post-1964 Brazilian Economic Policy" in Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil:
Origins, Policies and Future. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973.
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has turned the country into the leading model of a democratic political
economy, supplanting both Chile and Venezuela (too radical and destabi-
lizing) among Latin American nations. Thus, recent leftist victories in
both El Salvador and Peru featured presidents who explicitly evoked
"Lulism" 5 and the Brazilian model in their plans for governing. Finally,
Brazil has assumed a greater visibility in the global political economy in a
variety of ways, including the prospect of developing into a leading pro-
ducer of oil and through its multilatinas' (Latin American multinational
corporations) operations around the world.
Economic Performance: If Brazil's international stature is somewhat
subjective, its economic performance paints a striking picture of change.
From 1985 to 2000, Brazil suffered from volatile growth, chronic debt and
deficits, high poverty, inequality and unemployment, and high inflation
through 1994. Yet, by 2003, growth stabilized at modest, but positive
levels; debt and deficits were replaced by surpluses; poverty, inequality,
and unemployment all declined dramatically; and inflation disappeared as
a serious threat. The data presented below tells a stark story. Brazil is
not among the fastest growing economies in the world, but the contrast
between the pre- and post-2003 period is so striking that it is impossible
to deny that something significant happened.
For example, GDP growth between 1988 (the year the young democ-
racy's constitution was promulgated) and 2003 averaged only 1.8 percent
per year. Real wage growth was better, averaging 4.2 percent per year,
although both GDP and real wage performance were very volatile. The
Real Plan of 1994 played a crucial role in reducing inflation from an aver-
age of over 1300 percent per year to an average of only 9.3 percent
through 2003. By contrast, average GDP growth since the early 2000s has
roughly doubled to 3.6 percent with average GDP/capita growth close to
3 percent. Inflation, even with pressure from rising capital inflows and
currency appreciation, has remained below 6 percent per year. The GINI
coefficient fell from highs around .60 in the 1990s to roughly .54 by the
late 2000s.
The Quality of Policy: The country's performance since 2002 has im-
proved, but there is no question that growth in the global economy, par-
ticularly driven by Chinese expansion and commodity consumption, has
played a critical role. One could argue, then, that Brazil's success is to
have had the good fortune to be a major exporter of commodities like
soy. High commodity prices and unusually positive terms of trade for
commodities are an important factor in Brazil's success, but the country
also stands out for the quality of policies passed, especially since 1994.
That quality has shown in a number of different areas, such as health
5. "Lulism" is a term coined by The Economist. See, for example, "Stepping into
Outsize Shoes." The Economist, November 4, 2010.
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care,6 privatization of telecommunications,7 and financial regulation. But
probably no area has captured as much attention globally as the condi-
tional cash transfer program, Bolsa Famflia (Family Stipend).
Bolsa Famlia is a monthly stipend targeted to the poorest Brazilians
(about eleven million families). It has several important features that ele-
vate it beyond a simple aid program and reveal the quality of both the
design and the implementation.8 The program's goals are to alleviate
poverty and hunger while developing human capital. In addition, the de-
sign empowers female heads of households and dramatically reduces the
possibilities for clientelist or partisan manipulation. Each month, poor
households identified locally and verified by census data, receive cash
transfers with sliding values depending on income and the number of chil-
dren. The money is transferred electronically and drawn through a debit
card to prevent middlemen and/or local officials from withholding or
manipulating payments. Mothers receive the debit cards, because fathers
are frequently absent in poor households; and if they are present, they
are much less likely to spend money on the household. Finally, house-
holds need to meet a series of requirements in order to receive payments,
including regular medical check-ups for children and at least an 80 per-
cent attendance rate in school.9
The program is not without flaws or critics,10 but there is little argu-
ment about several tangible benefits. First, it has contributed to an ongo-
6. See James McGuire, Wealth, Health and Democracy in East Asia and Latin
America, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010 for a discussion of the
enormous advances in health care achieved in Brazil over the 1990s and 2000s.
7. Brazil's regulatory institutions are still a work in progress, but the privatization of
Telebris and the subsequent regulation of the sector remains one of the more suc-
cessful cases in the region. See Peter Kingstone, "Privatizing Telebris: Brazilian
Political Institutions and Policy Performance." Comparative Politics. Vol. 36, No. 1,
2003: 21-40; and Aline Diniz Amaral, Peter Kingstone and Jonathan Kriekhaus
"The Limits of Economic Reform in Brazil," in Peter Kingstone and Timothy
Power, eds. Democratic Brazil Revisited. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 2008.
8. See M6nica Haddad, "A Spatial Analysis of Bolsa Familia: Is Allocation Target-
ting the Needy?," in Brazil under Lula: Economy, Politics and Society under the
Worker-President, Joseph L. Love and Werner Baer, eds. New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2009.
9. Details of the policy can be found in Natasha Borges Sugiyama, "Theories of Dif-
fusion: Social Sector Reform in Brazil," Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 2,
2008. The process of political diffusion and ultimately expansion into a national
policy is discussed in Natasha Borges Sugiyama, "Diffusion of Good Government:
Social Sector Reforms in Brazil." Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, Forthcoming, as well as Marcus Andr6 Melo, "Unexpected Successes, Unan-
ticipated. Failures: Social Policy from Cardoso to Lula" in Peter Kingstone and
Timothy Power, eds. Democratic Brazil Revisited. Pittsburgh, University of Pitts-
burgh Press, 2008.
10. Among the more interesting critiques is Anthony Hall, "Brazil's Bolsa Familia: A
Doubled Edged Sword?" Development and Change, 2008, vol. 35, no.5, 2008: 799-
822, as well as Edmund Amman and Werner Baer, "The Macroeconomic Record
of the Lula Administration, the Roots of Brazil's Inequality, and Attempts to
Overcome Them," in Brazil under Lula: Economy, Politics and Society under the
Worker-President, Joseph L. Love and Werner Baer, eds. New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2009.
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ing decline in the level of poverty and inequality in the roughly ten years
since its inception. While Bolsa Famlia arguably accounts for at most
only a small part of this change-much of it is driven by economic
growth;" reports suggest that it has helped alter household consumption
patterns toward food and clothing for children. Furthermore, school en-
rollment rates have risen to roughly 100 percent through the eighth
grade. Finally, the program appears to have succeeded at delivering a
popular and effective social good without falling prey to either clientelis-
tic or partisan manipulation. In sum, the example of Bolsa Familia dem-
onstrates that Brazil's international standing and solid economic
performance rest on more than good fortune.
III. UNDERSTANDING BRAZILIAN SUCCESS
The Brazilian success story stands on the emergence of broad political
acceptance of a "pragmatic neoliberal" orientation to the economic pol-
icy. Brazil's pragmatic neoliberal model rests on three pillars: a commit-
ment to macroeconomic stability; a stronger commitment to market-
oriented policies, but with a continued, pragmatic role for the state; and
social policies to address the legacy of poverty and inequality in the coun-
try, of which the Bolsa Famlia, discussed above, is the most widely dis-
cussed example. This path began to take form under President Collor
(1990-1992) and has deepened and broadened in its support since then to
the point that, as of 2012, there is no real alternative in the electoral
arena. The discussion below elaborates on the first two elements of this
model. 12
A. MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
Macroeconomic stability presents perhaps the greatest surprise from
the country's performance in the 1980s and into the 1990s. Brazilian in-
flation appeared unsolvable, rooted both in inertial expectations and
structural sources of financial imbalance. Brazil wrestled with high exter-
nal debt, large budget deficits, and a weak financial system. High exter-
nal debts were a legacy of the "lost decade." Over the 1980s, Brazilian
export performance improved, but debt-servicing costs remained high
while low growth limited the country's capacity to find domestic savings.
The 1988 Constitution contributed to the weakness of public finances
11. Nancy Birdsall, Nora Lustig, and Darryl MacLeod, "Declining Inequality in Latin
America: Some Economics, Some Politics" in Peter Kingstone and Deborah
Yashar, eds. The Handbook of Latin American Politics. New York: Routledge
Press, 2012.
12. For an in-depth discussion of Brazil's "pragmatic neoliberal" model and its origins,
see Peter Kingstone and Aldo Ponce, "From Cardoso to Lula: the Triumph of
Pragmatism in Brazil," in Wendy Hunter, Raul Madrid, & Kurt Weyland, eds.
Leftist Governments in Latin America. Cambridge University Press, New York,
2010. The label "pragmatic neoliberalism" comes from Eduardo Silva in reference
to the Pinochet regime in Chile in the 1980s. See Eduardo Silva, State and Capital
in Chile Business Elites, Technocrats, and Market Economics Boulder: Westview
Press, 1996.
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through mandated transfers to the state and local level without accompa-
nying spending obligations. As a result, this perverse fiscal federalism
consistently undermined federal efforts to reduce budget deficits while
facilitating patronage and clientelist spending behavior at the state and
local level. Legislators in the national level Congress tended to work to-
gether to protect transfers to their own states specifically as well as resist
efforts to restore revenues at the federal level.13
Persistent budget deficits and their related consequences for national
debt (external and internal) also made it difficult to solve inflation. Infla-
tion had been the scourge of Brazil's economy almost continuously since
the 1940s. The military dictatorship had developed and implemented a
system for managing inflation through indexation of virtually all contracts
and prices ("monetary correction"), but the inflationary spiral that took
off under restored democratic rule after 1985 overwhelmed it. High infla-
tion contributed to weak control over public finances as well as the pri-
vate banking system. In large measure, that was because high inflation
made it difficult to precisely measure assets and liabilities. Thus, high
debt, persistent budget deficits, chronic high inflation, and disordered fi-
nances in both public and private institutions imposed seemingly impassa-
ble barriers to development.
Yet, by the late 1990s, Brazil was well on its way to cleaning up the
mess inherent in this cluster of interrelated problems. The starting point
was Fernando Henrique Cardoso's (PSDB) Real Plan negotiated over
1993 and gradually implemented over 1994. The plan's combination of
transparency, negotiation, and gradualism were vital ingredients in the
effort to convert Brazil's currency into a new one, the real. The real was
loosely linked to the dollar and premised on a negotiated fiscal adjust-
ment that temporarily shifted sufficient revenues back to the federal gov-
ernment to lend credibility to the administration's anti-inflation
commitments. The effects appeared rapidly. The full conversion to the
real took place in July of 1994, with inflation running at roughly 25 per-
cent per month. By October of 1994, inflation had fallen to 2 percent per
month. Inflation has remained at manageable levels, averaging below 10
percent since then and below 8 percent almost continuously through the
2000s.
The negotiation resulting in the temporary drawback of revenues-the
"Emergency Social Fund"-turned out to be the opening salvo in an
ongoing round of efforts to restore federal control over revenues. As
Kurt Weyland has argued, President Cardoso effectively traded short-
term patronage benefits for administrative reforms that restored the fed-
eral government's fiscal balance.14 In addition, passage of a new tax on
13. Fernando Luiz Abrucio, "Os bar6es do poder: 0 poder dos governadores no Bra-
sil, pos-autoritgrio." Master's Thesis, Department of Sociology, Universidade de
Sao Paulo, 1994.
14. Kurt Weyland, "The Brazilian State in the New Democracy." Journal of Interna-
tional Studies and World Affairs 39:4, 63-94, 1997.
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financial transactions led to a surge in federal tax revenues. From 1994 to
2011, tax revenues rose from roughly 25 percent of GDP to over 35 per-
cent of GDP, sharply improving the government's fiscal position and en-
hancing the credible commitment to keep inflation low.
Ultimately, the Real Plan collapsed as a run on the currency in January
1999 forced the government to give up on the dollar as a loose anchor.
But a much stronger fiscal position allowed the Cardoso administration
and its successors to rely on inflation targeting as a mechanism for keep-
ing inflation low, even without the exchange rate anchor. Both President
Cardoso (PSDB) and his Workers' Party (PT) successors, Lula da Silva
and Dilma Rousseff, have consistently announced annual primary surplus
targets as high as 4 percent of GDP in their bid to maintain low inflation.
The challenge has grown since the 2008 global crisis as Brazil's economic
performance has lured in vast amounts of foreign currency, driving up the
real and generating inflationary pressure. Yet, inflation has remained be-
low 6 percent per year due to the government's diligence in meeting their
targets.
Reduced inflation also contributed to Brazil's new economic strength
by allowing the Cardoso administration to begin cleaning up the banking
system. Weak banks, private and public, had survived by profiting from
the inflation tax as well as by the confusion over the exact state of their
assets and liabilities. Reducing inflation forced banks to operate more
efficiently and competitively and exposed fragile institutions-particu-
larly state level banks that had relied on access to the federal government
to continue to function. The Cardoso administration initiated a series of
programs to strengthen the financial sector, including privatization of
some state-owned institutions, as well as closing down or supporting the
sale of weak institutions. The reform process did increase federal debt
considerably, but the end result was a much stronger financial system
supported by much better prudential regulation.' 5
The results of the country's improved finances probably showed most
clearly in the response to the 2008 global crisis. The initial effects of the
crisis were transmitted to Brazil as a trade shock, with export volumes
and prices falling sharply in early 2009. But while falling exports pushed
the country into recession, the typical historic pattern of financial crisis
did not emerge. Instead, the Lula administration responded with a series
of stimulus measures, including an expansion of consumer credit and re-
duction of taxes on a range of consumer durables as well as a large-scale
infrastructure investment program (the Program for the Acceleration of
Growth-PAC). By late 2009, growth had resumed and capital was flow-
ing into Brazil again with rising bond issuances and falling yields.16
15. The details of public sector and financial system reforms are detailed in Albert
Fishlow's Starting Over: Brazil since 1985. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute,
2011.
16. See Jos6 Antonio Ocampo, "Latin American Development after the Global Crisis"
in New Ideas on Development after the Financial Crisis, Nancy Birdsall and Francis
Fukuyama, eds. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011 for a discus-
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The country's macroeconomic position was greatly improved, as Brazil
paid off its dollar denominated external debt by the late 2000s and in fact,
as of 2012, is an international creditor nation. Indeed, the IMF has
turned to Brazil among other leading emerging markets for contributions
to the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)-something that Bra-
zil has indicated willingness to do, but in exchange for reforms of the IMF
power structure.17 The sharp decline in external debt, in turn, reflects the
country's tremendous increase in export revenues over the 2000s. Export
revenues have roughly quintupled since 2000 and while imports have in-
creased as well, the current account generated large surpluses through
much of the 2000s. Current account surpluses, capital inflows, and an
appreciating currency all drove external debt down while high tax reve-
nues helped drive down even domestic debt from a recent high of roughly
80 percent of GDP in 2003 to roughly 65 percent in 2011, despite the Lula
administration's turn to fiscal stimulus in the wake of the 2008 crisis.18
B. STATE SUPPORT AND MARKET REFORM
Brazil's financial stability has been in turn both a cause of improved
economic competitiveness as well as benefiting from improved micro-
level performance. The improved performance has rested on two ele-
ments: greatly increased competitiveness in the agricultural sector and
the emergence of a segment of leading firms in industry and services-the
so-called multilatinas (the set of Latin American multinational enter-
prises among which Brazilian firms figure prominently). Agriculture,
agribusiness, and agroenergy form the basis of Brazil's position as an "ag-
ricultural superpower."' 9 In fact, by 2005, Brazil was either the leading
or second largest exporter in the world of a range of agricultural and
agroenergy products, including soy, sugar/ethanol, coffee, orange juice,
and meat. By 2011, Brazilian exports reached record volumes and values
on the back of a nearly fourfold increase in commodity exports since
2005. The rise of agriculture actually dates back to the 1980s and ironi-
cally stems in no small measure from the withdrawal of government sup-
port and protection and the resulting need for the sector to improve its
competitiveness. 20 In the 1990s and into the 2000s, the government's role
sion of the effects of the crisis and the response both in terms of stimulus spending
and reactions in financial markets.
17. Annie Lowry, "I.M.F. Adds $430 Billion in Emergency Lending Ability," New
York Times, April 20, 2012. Accessed online June 30, 2012 at http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/04/21 /business/global/imf-adds-430-billion-in-emergency-lending-ability.
html.
18. Data from Instituto Brasileiro da Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE), accessed online
June 30, 2012 at http://www.ibge.gov.br.
19. Andr6 Meloni Nassar, "Brazil as Agriculture and Agroenergy Superpower," in
Brazil as an Economic Superpower? Understanding Brazil's Changing Role in the
Global Economy, Lael Brainard and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, eds. Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2009.
20. Steven Helfand and Gervisio Castro de Rezende, "The Impact of Sector-Specific
and Economy-Wide Policy Reforms on the Agricultural Sector in Brazil: 1980-
1998." Contemporary Economic Policy, 22:2, pp. 194-212.
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has been essentially complementary to private sector improvements,
mainly through infrastructure investment, support for research, and nego-
tiating commercial relations.21
The government's role outside of agriculture has also worked to com-
plement the market, particularly through support from the National Bank
for Social and Economic Development (BNDES) for Brazil's emergent
sectors and firms. This represents a significant change from the "develop-
mentalist" period of the 1950s through the 1970s, when Brazilian govern-
ment intervention largely operated against markets-either through
displacement of private firms, or by subsidizing private production and
sheltering it from competitive pressures. By contrast, contemporary pol-
icy is aimed at strengthening private firms' and sectors' participation in
global markets. The BNDES has actively supported key multilatinas such
as Odebrecht (construction), Andrade Gutierrez (telecoms), Embraer
(aviation), and CVRD (mining). BNDES financing has supported in-
creasing sales, exports, and research and development (R&D) domesti-
cally and even expanding operations and acquisition of assets in new
markets.22
Finally, the Brazilian government has promoted public-private partner-
ships in infrastructure investment, primarily through the Plano de Acdo
de Crescimento (PAC). The PAC, introduced in the wake of the global
crisis of 2008-2009, injected roughly half a billion dollars to support pri-
vate infrastructure investment. The PAC has not been as successful as
hoped, and subsequent plans, such as the PAC2 or "Bigger Brazil," have
not been fully implemented. Furthermore, investments in infrastructure
for the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics, both in Rio de
Janeiro, have fallen short of what is needed. Nevertheless, the new em-
phasis on supporting the private sector represents a shift in orientation.
While there are still important elements of nationalism and protection-
ism, the attitude towards the private sector and the international econ-
omy leans toward competitive integration and participation.
IV. THE LIMITS TO SUCCESS
While Brazil's performance has generated enthusiasm both inside and
outside the country, it is important not to overstate the case. Brazilian
growth rates have looked good in the 2000s, but mostly in comparison to
the country's recent past or to the woeful performance of the developed
economies. GDP growth has averaged only around 3.6 percent since
2000 and GDP per capita has averaged only 2.4 percent. Brazil weath-
21. Geraldo Barros, "Brazil: The Challenges in Becoming an Agricultural Super-
power," in Brazil as an Economic Superpower? Understanding Brazil's Changing
Role in the Global Economy, Lael Brainard and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, eds.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2009.
22. Edmund Amman, "Technology, Public Policy and the Emergence of Brazilian
Multinationals," in Brazil as an Economic Superpower? Understanding Brazil's
Changing Role in the Global Economy, Lael Brainard and Leonardo Martinez-
Diaz, eds. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2009.
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ered the 2008-2009 crisis well as GDP growth fell in the first half of 2009
before rebounding dramatically into 2010. But the rate of growth fell to
2.7 percent in 2011, led by very anemic results for industry, and projec-
tions going forward are for continued modest performance, particularly if
Chinese growth rates continue to slow along with declining consumption
of commodity imports.23
This last issue points to one of the central concerns about Brazil's per-
formance over the last decade. Arguably, the main engine of the "mira-
cle" is the dramatic increase in commodity exports, especially to China.
Brazil exported roughly 6 percent of GDP in the 1990s in the wake of the
trade liberalization process. As Brazil liberalized trade in the 1990s, ex-
ports rose considerably with manufactured goods leading the way. By
2000, exports of manufactured goods were over 50 percent of the value of
total exports, exceeding the value of semi-manufactured and primary
products combined. Exports to China were not vital and were almost
entirely composed of commodities. But by 2011, the picture had changed
considerably. Total exports had more than doubled in value to a total of
256 billion U.S. dollars, but more than 50 percent of that came from pri-
mary products, especially soy, iron ore, sugar, meat, and orange juice.
Commodity exports increased by roughly four times between 2005 and
2010 alone. In addition, the dramatic increase in commodity exports was
matched by the dramatic increase in dependence on China as a market.
Soy and iron, two of Brazil's most important exports, were heavily con-
centrated on sales to China, with over 40 percent of exports of soy and
roughly one-third of iron going to China specifically. 24
At the same time, currency appreciation has hurt manufacturing. The
real has been appreciating (over 40 percent since 2010 alone and over 70
percent between 2003 and 2010)25 both because of Brazil's export success
and because it looks to be a safer haven than the debt-ridden developed
economies. But the result is a weakening of Brazilian industry, with a
sharp fall in the percentage of manufactured goods in total exports, espe-
cially since 2009, and a doubling of the coefficient of import penetration
to 20 percent between 2003 and 2010. While roughly 75 percent of Bra-
zil's exports to China are commodities, China exports primarily manufac-
tured goods to Brazil.
Perhaps the biggest indicator, however, of Brazil's manufacturing chal-
lenge appears in estimates of export competition with other rising eco-
nomic players, especially China. China's export performance in both
manufactured goods generally and in high-tech sectors specifically has
23. Data from the Instituto Brasileiro da Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE), accessed on-
line June 30, 2012 at http://seriesestatisticas.ibge.gov.br.
24. Kevin Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski, The Dragon in the Room: China and
the Future of Latin American Industrialization. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2010.
25. Annabelle Mourougane, "Examining the Appreciation of the Brazilian real."
OECD Economics Department, Working Paper No. 901. October 21, 2011. Ac-
cessed online June 30, 2012 at http://www.oecd.orgleco/workingpapers.
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grown dramatically over the past decade, more than doubling its share of
global exports between 2000 and 2006. This has put Brazil and China in
direct competition in a large number of export markets, with China pos-
ing increasing threats to Brazilian goods. Kevin Gallagher and Roberto
Porzecanski have charted this rising threat, differentiating between mar-
kets where Chinese exports are rising while Brazilian exports are falling
(direct threat) and markets where both are rising, but China's exports
have been rising faster (partial threat). 26 All told, they found that by
2006, 91 percent of all Brazilian manufactured exports and almost 94 per-
cent of Brazilian high-tech exports were under threat from Chinese
competition.
Brazil's performance in the production and export of high-tech goods
points to an additional source of concern about the country's develop-
mental progress. Sustainable and equitable development needs high
quality jobs that in turn rest on the ability of the country to educate its
citizens, produce high-skill labor, and develop and diffuse technology.
These various elements of the "knowledge economy" are all areas where
Brazil has made very limited progress even as other emerging market
competitors have made considerable progress, again China in particular.
The World Bank's Knowledge Economy Index is an effort to capture the
ability of a country to develop and diffuse technology and put it to pro-
ductive use. Brazil ranks ahead of some of its competitors among middle
income rising markets, including China, India, Mexico, and Turkey, but
below others such as Russia, Chile, South Korea, and most of Eastern
Europe. But perhaps more importantly, there has been only modest im-
provement between 1995 and 2012, with most of the improvement occur-
ring between 1995 and 2000. In effect, commodity export profits have
concealed the lack of success in promoting progress on deeper develop-
ment goals. 27
The lack of progress is not surprising when reviewing key policy areas
related to developing a knowledge economy. For example, R&D spend-
ing, both public and private, fell over the 2000s, with significant decreases
in state and federal spending offsetting at best modest increases in private
expenditures. 28 Brazil spends roughly 1 percent of GDP on R&D, well
behind key competitors like China or South Korea.29 While China's
global share of high-tech exports has grown to over 13 percent by 2005
from .7 percent in 1990, Brazil's has moved up and down from a low of .2
percent in 1995 to a high of .5 percent in 2000 and then falling to .4 per-
cent by 2005. In short, the limited change in high-tech export perform-
26. Gallagher and Porzecanski, The Dragon in the Room.
27. Data from World Bank Knowledge Economy Index, accessed online June 30, 2012
at http://www.worldbank.org.
28. Ben Ross Schneider, "Big Business in Brazil: Leveraging Natural Endowments
and State Support for International Expansion," in Brazil as an Economic Super-
power? Understanding Brazil's Changing Role in the Global Economy, Lael Brai-




ance is consistent with the limited changes in the Knowledge Economy
Index.
Another key element limiting Brazil's development is the weakness of
its educational system.30 Bolsa Familia, the highly touted and very suc-
cessful conditional cash transfer program introduced by Fernando
Henrique Cardoso and then expanded by Lula, greatly increased secon-
dary school enrollments.31 But the success of Bolsa Familia has not been
matched by a sustained commitment to improving schooling. That is un-
fortunate as Brazil's public schools suffer from a cluster of deep structural
problems stemming from both inadequate funding (such as lack of facili-
ties, poor physical infrastructure, and low teacher pay) as well as institu-
tional weaknesses (including poor teacher training and supervision and
patronage hiring of unqualified principals and teachers). 32 Moreover,
public funding of education at all levels has actually declined over the
2000s even as enrollments have increased. One measure of the lack of
progress in education is Brazil's poor performance and lack of improve-
ment on Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) scores
over the 2000s. Brazil's results, especially in science and math, rank well
below China, Russia, and Latin American leaders such as Chile, Costa
Rica, and Uruguay. Similarly, Brazil ranks among the weakest countries
on the percentage of students at or below the lowest level of proficiency
in science and among the highest student to teacher ratios. 33
The economy reflects this in a number of ways that limit Brazil's per-
formance in manufacturing generally and high-tech production particu-
larly. Perhaps the most important way is in the scarcity of skilled labor
and the low productivity of labor. Both factors have contributed to rising
unit labor costs (although currency appreciation has played a significant
role) over the past ten years. Unit labor costs have risen over 120 percent
since 2003, hurting the competitiveness of Brazilian manufacturing. 34
The scarcity of skilled labor has meant that firms rely heavily on unskilled
labor even among more capital-intensive sectors of the economy.35
30. For an excellent review of the challenges facing Brazil's education system, see
Mary Arends-Kuenning, "A Report Card for Lula: Progress in Education," in Bra-
zil under Lula: Economy, Politics and Society under the Worker-President, Joseph
L. Love and Werner Baer, eds. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009.
31. In fact, the improvements in secondary school enrollments account for much of
Brazil's improvement in the Knowledge Economy Index from 1995 to the present.
32. See Bernd Reiter for a detailed discussion of the inequities and deficiencies of
public education, particularly in poorer communities. Bernd Reiter, Negotiating
Democracy in Brazil: The Politics of Exclusion. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Press, 2009.
33. Programme for International Student Assessments data accessed online June 30,
2012, available at http://www.oecd.org.
34. The Brazilian Economy, March 2012, pp. 25-26.
35. Ben Ross Schneider, "Big Business in Brazil: Leveraging Natural Endowments
and State Support for International Expansion," in Brazil as an Economic Super-
power? Understanding Brazil's Changing Role in the Global Economy, Lael Brai-
nard and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, eds. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute,
2009.
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Investment in education is not the only challenge facing the country as
it moves forward. The last problem for the development of the economy
is that Brazil's infrastructure is a crucial impediment to improving com-
petitiveness. Unfortunately, investment in infrastructure-everything
from energy to transportation-lags well behind the country's needs.
Even with increased government efforts in anticipation of the Rio-based
Olympics and World Cup, infrastructure investment levels are far short of
what is needed and well below investment rates of competitors like India,
China, Chile, or Colombia. Between 2001 and 2010, both public and pri-
vate infrastructure investment averaged less than 2.5 percent of GDP,
while estimates are that at least 3 percent of GDP is necessary just to
prevent deterioration.36 The lack of investment, in turn, is rooted in a
series of factors. Among the most important are the low levels of sav-
ings-less than 20 percent of GDP-and the burden of social spending,
most critically Brazil's regressive pension system that accounts alone for
18 percent of GDP.3 7 Furthermore, the commodity boom discussed
above helped generate record exports, but the associated currency appre-
ciation also helped fuel comparable increases in imported goods, particu-
larly of manufactured goods, minimizing available revenues for
investment. In short, ongoing structural obstacles coupled with the limi-
tations of the commodity boom stand in the way of the kind of productive
investments necessary to secure prosperity in the medium to long term.
In sum, Brazil's economic successes of the 2000s rest heavily on the
commodity boom driven by Chinese consumption. But the boom has
both weakened the manufacturing sector and concealed the urgency of
the need to solve the deeper problems hindering development. Most crit-
ically, Brazil's workforce is largely unskilled and, combined with a poor
education system, prevents the economy from moving up the knowledge
economy ladder. Unfortunately, some of Brazil's most important com-
petitors in the global economy, particularly China, have made much
greater strides on this front. Equitable development sustained over the
long term will depend on more than commodity exports. Brazilian policy
makers understand that, but the measures necessary for addressing the
challenges have not advanced in any notable way.
V. CONCLUSION
For those who have watched Brazil through the 1980s and 1990s, it is
hard not to feel optimistic about the country's prospects. The voyage
from chaos to "BRIC" has been impressive and credit is due to a sizable
group of politicians, policy makers, and businesses. The economy stabi-
lized and grew on the back of momentous improvements in
macroeconomic management. The political environment has grown more
orderly and provides a greater degree of certainty than ever before in the
36. The Brazilian Economy, August 2011, pp. 38-40.
37. The Brazilian Economy, February 2012, p. 10.
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history of the New Republic. Brazilian firms have emerged as global
leaders, while certain sectors, especially in agriculture and agroenergy,
have emerged as genuine success stories. Nevertheless, the limits to
growth and sustainable development remain significant. There is no
guarantee that Brazilian policy makers will solve this in time to keep up
with global competitors. Education, innovation, and infrastructure are
critical pieces of the knowledge economy. Without investment today,
there are no guarantees about the future.
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